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Following to my previous article published in Journal of Asia-Pacic Studies, No. 16 dated on May 
1, 2011, Study Group of Preventive Diplomacy in the Institute of Asia-Pacic Studies, Waseda University, 
has reviewed the continuous discussion on the subjects of trends and changes on humanitarian military 
intervention aer the Cold War through the cases of Rwanda and Kosovo.
1.　Introduction
e purpose of this article is to specify to what extent has changed on humanitarian military in-
tervention aer the Cold War and whether we can identify any general trends in humanitarian mili-
tary intervention on the operations of Rwanda and Kosovo.
Humanitarian military intervention has been one of the primary issues in international society af-
ter Cold War, and it has continued to inuence the international political agenda.
is issue involves military and legal aspects, especially the codication of sovereign inviolability 
and other moral matters on how to save the people from the situation of genocide. e end of the Cold 
War has not altered the fundamental nature of state-interest decision making. At the same time, the 
types of civil wars, as well as international response to them, are dierent from their predecessors of 
the century and certainly those of the Cold War period. e present context for the use of outside mili-
tary forces under the United Nations auspices and the historical precedents for military-civilian hu-
manitarianism are an essential part of the background necessary to evaluate more precisely the costs 
and benets of military intervention in the various humanitarian tragedies, such as the cases Rwanda 
and Kosovo. Before exploring the contemporary context, a brief introduction to humanitarian actors 
and a historical interpretation of military-civilian interactions are in order.
Simply listing the contemporary cast of characters on the international humanitarian stage, along 
with the strengths and weaknesses displayed in their respective roles, can be confusing even to a 
knowledgeable critic. It would thus be useful to describe the most important humanitarian actors in 
some detail.
Major institutional actors make up the existing system of international assistance and protection, 
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or what is called ‘humanitarian action.’ ree sets of actors are based within conict areas: host gov-
ernments and military forces; insurgent political and military forces; and national and local private or-
ganizations. e focus here on the cases of Rwanda and Kosovo is on external actors who dominate 
the delivery of emergency assistance and protection of human rights.i
2.　Rwanda
e Rwanda case indicates, to what extent, demonstration the danger inherent international mili-
tary intervention in intra-state conicts. e tragic case of Rwanda points to the importance of under-
standing the nature of the threat to unarmed civilians. It was a situation that called for fast reaction by 
a large number of lightly armed foreign troops. e genocide was perpetrated by very lightly armed 
militiamen who were not a signicant military force. at is why a tiny, weak UN mission was instru-
mental in saving as many as 20 000 people through point protection.
e burden of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda （UNAMIR）, and its only advantage, was 
time. In a rapidly developing genocide, fast action saved lives. It could have saved more lives if Western 
political leaders had not cut the international force to the bone. ose leaders feared another Somalia 
or Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Rwanda was not. When France plucked up the courage to act, Op-
eration Turquoise was suited to oppose and army and it had trouble controlling the thuggish violence 
that engulfed Rwanda. Whereas militiamen were easily deterred by point protection, they remained 
largely free to continue killing in places where there was no immediate foreign presence, even inside a 
formally declare safe zone. Most of the 17,000-20,000 people whom French troops saved were at a sin-
gle location. In other words, they beneted from point protection within the large safe zone.
In situations where the killers are mere thugs and the army is unable or unwilling to back them up 
when confronted by foreign troops, a fast and light intervention force can save a great many lives. e 
problem with this observation is that policymakers oen cannot be sure before an intervention wheth-
er the target countries will back the thugs.
e Rwanda case presents the dilemma of overlapping humanitarian and political motives in stark 
terms. Operation Turquoise was driven by competing political and humanitarian objectives. France 
could have save more lives and done more to capture the gynocidaires if it had not been eager to help 
its Hutu allies. However, but for its political interests, France would probably have declined to inter-
vene at all, just like every other Western country did.ii
In this respect, two points should be emphasized. First, to make the case for intervention required 
connecting such action to interests. State interests were hardly engaged by the unfolding tragedy in 
Rwanda.  In fact, member states and members of the U. S. Mission framed any prospective interven-
tion in the language of obligation. eir troops generally demands a connection to the language of 
state interests rather than of international obligations. Second, those member states who opposed in-
tervention for self-interested reasons were reluctant to publicly display such calculations; much more 
morally palatable and defensible was the argument that the Security Council had an obligation and in-
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terest to protect its peacekeepers, and the future of UN.
Some nonpermanent members of the Security Council, however, demanded robust action to pro-
tect civilians, couching their arguments in terms of the ‘international community,’ referring thereby to 
a moral order that the transcended state boundaries. But at the time, that such language was designed 
to lure the United States into doing the work of and for the ‘international community referring thereby 
to a moral of those members who resisted intervention. While they were arguing for action, however, 
they were not volunteering their own troops and were insinuating that the United States should take 
the lead. As some of us at the U. S. Mission joked about other proposed and existing UN operations, 
the international community seemed willing to ght down to the last U. S. citizen. e rhetoric of the 
international community, then, became something to fear and reinforced the defense of U. S. interests. 
In general, member states used the language of the international community and the defense of the 
UN to hide their own unwillingness to get involved and sometimes to implicate others.iii
e genocide in Rwanda also led to a questioning of the very ecacy of both peacekeeping and 
humanitarian intervention. Many lamented the international community’s ‘failure to act’ and the Unit-
ed Nations’ inadequate preventative capacity, others argue that the lesson of Rwanda was actually in-
ternational intervention, in the form of peacekeeping, mediation or military intervention, oen had 
deleterious consequences.
us preventive diplomacy, as clearly practiced in Rwanda from 1990–4, is not universally herald-
ed as a necessity. e eventual French intervention, as previously noted, had mixed, if not in fact ulti-
mately negative results, and thus served to further tarnish the image of international intervention. 
While few argued that a policy of non-intervention should be maintained in the face of genocide, 
some concluded that it was perhaps best to stay out of intra-state conicts as such disputes, like the 
American Civil War, can only be resolved by the parties themselves and probably through the defeat of 
one side by the other.iv
3.　Kosovo
A humanitarian crisis in Kosovo that had long been anticipated by many Balkan political observ-
ers accelerated in 1998 and exploded in March 1999 when North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
（NATO） attacked Yugoslavia with air power. Operation Allied Force was a milestone: the rst time in 
NATO’s y-year history that it had gone to war, and primarily for a humanitarian cause rather than a 
defensive or security reason. NATO’s intervention began several months earlier at a peace conference 
at Rambouillet in France, where it dictated terms aecting Yugoslavia’s sovereignty which the govern-
ment in Belgrade was obliged to accept, or suer military consequences.
International intervention in Bosnia had the consent of the newly independent Bosnian govern-
ment, whose sovereignty was challenged by armed Serb and Croatia secessionists. However, interna-
tional military intervention in Kosovo was denied consent by sovereign government of Yugoslavia, 
which was similarly challenged by armed Albanian secessionists.  NATO’s eventual in Bosnia, aer 
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several years of vacillation, was to enforce an international agreement between the belligerent parties 
designed to preserve the Bosnian state, and protect human rights.  NATO’s military intervention in 
Kosovo was to save the Kosovo Albanians, at the risk of partitioning the Yugoslav state.  e Kosovo 
intervention trespassed on basic norms of the UN Charter and took place without a mandate from the 
UN Security Council.  e primary justication for NATO’s intervention―in the crisp language of the 
British Foreign Oce―was ‘overwhelming humanitarian necessity’.  NATO is described as having had 
a ‘sense of shame’ stemming from their four years of anxiety, indecisiveness, and inaction in Bosnia. 
NATO states were concerned about the organization’s credibility.  Moreover, NATO’s military inter-
vention in Kosovo was targeted against the government: the USA, UK, and some other NATO coun-
tries clearly wanted to get rid of the government of  Milosevic.  ey explicitly said they were not at-
tacking the Serbian people.v
e Kosovo has been regarded as an example of ‘genuine’ humanitarian military   intervention by 
the eager to counter the claim that such action is always hypercritical and a function of geopolitics.
Many cases in the 1990s catalyzed intense debate about humanitarian intervention, and Kosovo 
constituted the high water mark of this discussion.  While the intervention sparked intense controver-
sy and was criticized on a number of grounds, the support for Operation Allied Force was unprece-
dented, and it constitutes the most widely acclaimed act of military humanitarian intervention in the 
contemporary era.  In light of the widespread international outcry at the attempt to portray the inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003 as an act of humanitarian military intervention, Kosovo has increasingly come to 
be used as a example of a ‘genuine’ humanitarian intervention by those eager to counter the claim that 
such action is always hypocritical and a function of geopolitics.
Interest in this issue remains enormous, and Kosovo’s place in the history of humanitarian mili-
tary intervention is surely secure.  e details of the conict between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians 
will doubtless remain contested, and Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 renewed 
the controversy surrounding the relationship between these two polarized groups.  Milosevic’s indict-
ment for crimes against humanity in the midst of NATO’s campaign and subsequent trial at e 
Hague, cut short by his death in 2006, constituted a new, if highly controversial, departure for interna-
tional law.  It is perhaps to be regretted, though perhaps it is not surprising, that the enormous interest 
in humanitarian intervention generated by Operation Allied Force has not resulted in a resolution of 
the penumbra that is humanitarian intervention.  e primary sources of dissonance exposed by Op-
eration Allied Force remain despite the many eorts since to generate consensus.vi
at is not to forget even for one moment that Kosovo was a humanitarian disaster for the people 
of Kosovo and of Yugoslavia more generally.  In fact, it was a disaster of their own making and it was 
their domestic crisis.  Kosovo was signicantly dierent from Croatia and Bosnia in that crucial re-
spect.  President Milosevic played political roulette by arbitrarily taking away Kosovo’s rights of local 
autonomy within the state of Yugoslavia.  e majority population of Yugoslavia, the Serbs, supported 
him, probably overwhelmingly.  In that regard, the Serbian leader could be accused of acting as a dem-
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agogue rather than a statesman.  e minority Kosovo Albanian population overwhelmingly opposed 
him.  Kosovo Albanian militants, later known as Kosovo Liberation Army （KLA）, threw their own 
political caution to the wind by engaging in armed rebellion against the Yugoslavia state with the aim 
of carving Kosovo out of Yugoslavia.  In doing that they split with the peaceful party of Kosovo Alba-
nians who sought a rapprochement with Belgrade that would restore their constitutional rights.  But 
many Kosovo Albanians supported the secessionist KLA.  e Kosovo disaster was thus created by 
President Milosevic with the popular support of the Serbs; it was enlarged by certain Kosovo Albanian 
warlords who enjoyed substantial popular support from among the Kosovo Albanian people.
e Kosovo disaster was a tragedy for everybody, Serbs and Albanians alike, who was caught in it 
and victimized by it.  at it was a humanitarian disaster there can be no doubt―although of far lower 
magnitude than originally estimated by NATO.  But the claim that it was an international crisis that re-
quired military intervention was unfounded.  It did not present the serious threat to international 
peace and security either in the Balkans or beyond.  It became a major international crisis only when 
NATO decided to intervene on its own initiative and without a full international mandate.  NATO got 
involved for humanitarian reasons that no civilized person could question.  However, the leading 
NATO posers, and its particular the USA, could be criticized for losing sight of the bigger picture. 
ere is some basis for believing that, by intervening, NATO may have made the humanitarian disas-
ter worse rather than better.  What it made denitely better were the secessionist prospects of the 
Kosovo Albanians.vii
4.　Lessons from Rwanda and Kosovo :  Conditions for Success
A humanitarian military intervention can be considered a success when it saves lives.  Military in-
tervention to defeat the perpetrators of violence is not humanitarian in character but it can be human-
itarian in outcome.  An intervener must prepare for war and in most cases must actually engage in of-
fensive action until the perpetrators negotiate or are defeated.  is kind of intervention is very 
dicult and dangerous runs a serious risk of failure.  If the intervener fails to dominate the perpetra-
tors within the cost limits that its interests will allow, then it has to withdraw in defeat and give up al-
most all inuence over the course of events.  Intervention to defeat the perpetrators of violence can 
lead to more civilian deaths, the death or soldiers and long term instability.  On the other hand, if done 
right, it can stop genocide and mass killing.
One of the simplest ways to protect civilians in a conict zone is to guard people who have con-
gregated to seek safety in numbers or in a defendable building.  e easier of two basic scenarios is to 
post soldiers around a particular location, such as a stadium or a displaced persons’ camp, to deter an 
attack before it happens.  If belligerent attack the location anyway, the guards must ght to defend 
themselves and the civilians in their charge.  e more dicult scenario comes into play when a group 
of civilians is already under attack or under siege but not yet subject to direct violence.  In that circum-
stance, intervening soldiers must push the attackers back from the building or camp before they can 
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post guards to deter further attacks.  e Best-known, and perhaps only, example of this form of hu-
manitarian military intervention is the protection given by UN troops in Rwanda to Tutsi at several lo-
cations in Kigali, the capital, during the 1994 genocide.
Successfully guarding camps and buildings is subject to a number of conditions derived from the-
ories of deterrence and defense.  Choosing a strategy of deterring attackers assumes that the guards 
present a credible threat of causing the attackers more pain than they want to endure.  To do that the 
guards must be at least as well armed as the attackers, and preferably have some kind of fortication, 
which can be as simple as barbed wire.  e fact that the guards are present obviously communicates 
that the civilians should not be attacked.  It does no, however, send a clear signal about how willing the 
soldiers or their civilian leaders are to risk combat.
In the event of guards having to ght, they must benet from a local imbalance of power.  Given 
the low tolerance for casualties that governs nearly all humanitarian military interventions, that power 
imbalance should be signicant.  One of the best ways to achieve such an advantage is with air power. 
Successful defense is also made more likely by environmental variables that favor the defense, such as 
open space around the location being defended.
When guarding a group of civilians begins with compelling the attackers to retreat, similar condi-
tions apply but they are more stringent.  e silver lining is that once an intervention force makes 
good on demand, it will have an easier time convincing the attackers that is subsequent deterrent 
threats are serious.  e ultimatum to retreat must include an immediate deadline, before the group of 
civilians in question is slaughtered.  A credible threat to attack the attackers if they do not retreat de-
pends on communicating serious interest and making military resources available.  In short, it requires 
putting combat units on the ground.  e attacker might very well not believe that the intervener has 
the ability or the will to force an end to its predation, in which case the intervener has to generate the 
political will and military capacity to act quickly and forcefully.
All these permutations assume that the civilians have access to the bare necessities of life.  Since 
camps and buildings that are crowded with people quickly run out of clean water and food, some kind 
of relief access is necessary.  One possibility is that the protection operation is short-lived, attackers 
leave the area or are removed, and people can come and go in relative safety.  Another possibility is 
that relief workers bring in supplies and provide basic services.  is requires a certain degree of coor-
dination with the military guards, although it can be as simple as an agreement to allow transit in and 
out of the location.viii
Today’s successful interventions share a number of elements absent in earlier, failed missions. 
First, the interventions that respond the most quickly to unfolding events protect the most lives. Eth-
nic cleansing and mass atrocities oen occur in early phases of conicts, as Rwanda and Kosovo. is 
highlights the necessity of early warning indicators and capacity for immediate action. e UN still 
lacks standby capabilities to dispatch peacekeepers instantly to a conict area, but national or multina-
tional military forces have responded promptly under UN authority, and then aer a number of 
̶     ̶219
e Trends and Changes on Humanitarian Military Intervention aer the Cold War
months, they have handed o control to a UN peacekeeping force that may include soldiers from the 
original mission.viv
5.　Conclusions
e balance between state sovereignty and individual rights can be maintained by paying close at-
tention to the set of principles known as just war doctrine.  ese principles can help political leaders 
decide, by answering state in the service of human rights.
In many respects, the new humanitarianism, grounded in situational ethics, while being shaped 
by the linking of relief to development, has moved away from comprehensive coordinating frame-
works. e new humanitarianism prefers a relative and locally based system of reference. It relates, es-
sentially, to the type of immediate arrangements, relations and compromises that aid agencies them-
selves are able to establish on the ground. It minimizes the need for donor governments to provide 
overarching political frameworks as during the period of UN-led, system-wide operations.  e new 
humanitarianism is geared to the present era of humanitarian conditionality and its accompanying hi-
erarchy of concern. It is able to adjust to a range of possible engagements, from the more robust exam-
ple of liberal peace in the Kosovo to the local activities of a few UN organizations and NGOs in parts 
of Rwanda. While the duty-based ethics of humanitarian actions as right may have tended to ignore 
consequences, it did not normalize violence but was aronted by it. e consequentiality ethics of the 
new humanitarianism, however, in holding out the possibility of a better tomorrow as a price worth 
paying for suering today, has been a major source of the normalization of violence and complicity 
with its perpetrators.
Intervening powers must also proceed with the understanding that they cannot bring about liber-
al democratic states overnight. Objectives need to be tempered to match both local and international 
political constraints. Recent scholarship on post-conict state building suggests that the best approach 
may be a hybrid one in which outsiders and domestic leaders rely on local customs, politics, and prac-
tices to establish new institutions that can move over time toward international norms of accountable, 
legitimate, and democratic governance. Humanitarian military interventions involve an inherent con-
tradiction. ey use violence in order to control violence. Setbacks are almost inevitable, and so it is 
no surprise that the operations oen attract criticism. Yet when carried on thoughtfully, legitimately, 
and as part of a broader set of mechanisms designed to protect civilians, the use of military force for 
humanitarian purpose saves lives.x
e issues discussed in this article on the humanitarian military intervention are likely to contin-
ue for a long time and will not be resolved here, however, it is worth noting from the cases of Rwanda 
and Kosovo what conditions imply in regard to the successful consequences of humanitarian military 
intervention.




   i Weiss, T., ‘Military-Civilian Interactions,’ 1999, pp. 7–8
   ii Seybolt, T. ‘Humanitarian Military Intervention e Conditions For Success And Failure,’ 2008, pp. 214–215.
  iii Barnett, M. ‘e International Humanitarian Order,’ 2010, pp. 132–133.
  iv Herhir, A. ‘Humanitarian Intervention An Introduction,’ 2010, pp. 197–199.
   v Jackson, R., ‘e Global Covenant,’ 2000, pp. 277–278.
  vi Herhir, A. ‘Humanitarian Intervention An Introduction,’ 2010, pp. 218–219.
 vii Jackson, R., ‘e Global Covenant,’ 2000, pp. 292–293.
viii Seybolt, T. ‘Humanitarian Military Intervention e Conditions For Success And Failure,’ 2008, pp. 185–86.
 viv Benjamin A, Vallentino, “e True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention”, Foreign Aairs November/December, 2011, p. 57
   x Ibid, p. 59
References
1. Ayoob, Mohammed. e ird World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conict, and the International System. 
（Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1995）.
2. Ramcharan, Bertrand G. Preventive Diplomacy at the UN. （Indiana University Press, 2008）.
3. Reus-Smit, Christian. e Politics of International Law. （Cambridge University Press, 2004）.
4. Coicaud, Jean-Marc and Heiskanen, Veijo. e Legitimacy of International Organizations. （United Nations University Press, 
2001）.
5. Walker, R. B. J. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political eory. （Cambridge University Press, 1993）.
6. Welsh, Jennifer M. Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations. （Oxford University Press, 2006）.
7. Hehir, Aidan. Humanitarian Intervention. （Palgrave Macmillan, 2010）.
8. Tessitore, John and Woolfson, Susan. A Global Agenda. （University Press of America, Inc., 1994）.
9. Barnett, Michael N. e International Humanitarian Order. （Routledge Press, 2010）.
10. Weissman, Fabrice. In the Shadow of‘Just Wars’: Violence, Politics and Humanitarian Action. （Cornell University Press, 2004）.
11. Chesterman, Simon. Just War or just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law. （Oxford University Press, 
2001）.
12. Weiss, omas G. Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises. （Rowman &Littleeld Publisher, 1999）.
13. Homan, Peter.J and Weiss, omas G. Sword & Slave: Confronting New Wars and Humanita-rian Crises. （Rowman & Little-
eld Publisher, 2006）.
14. Avant, Deborah D., Finnemore, Martha and Sell, Susan K. Who Governs e Globe? （Cambridge University Press, 2010）.
15. Dueld, Mark. Global Governance and the New Wars: e Merging of Development and Security. （Zed Books, 2001）.
16. Buzan, Berry. People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. Second Ed. （Col-
chester: ECPR Press, 2007）.
17. Finnemore, Martha. e Purpose of Intervention. （Cornell Studies Security Aairs, 2004）.
18. Seybolt, Taylor B. Humanitarian Military Intervention: e Conditions for Success and Failure. （Oxford University Press, 
2008）.
19. Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane, Robert O. Humanitarian Intervention Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. （Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2003）.
20. Jackson, Robert. e Global Covenant. （Oxford University Press, 2005）.
21. Price, Richard M. Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics. （Cambridge University Press, 2008）.
22. Kaldor, Mary. New & Old Wars: Organize Violence in a Global Era. Second Ed. （Stanford University Press, 2007）.
23. Shelton, Dinah. Commitment and Compliance: e Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System. （Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2000）.
24. Dueld, Mark. Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples. （Polity Press, 2007）.
